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HOW A ND WHY ISLAMOPHOBIA IS TIED TO
ENGLISH NATIONALISM
BUT NOT TO SCOTTISH NATIONALISM
Asifa Hussain and William Miller
University of Glasgow
Muslim minoriti�s throughout Europe are under
threat of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush 'War on
Terror.' In Scotland they also have to cope with the
added possibility that Scottish nationalism might devel
op an 'ethnic' as well as a 'civic' dimension. But is
Scottish nationalism part of the problem or part of the
solution? Paradoxically, Muslims are under less pres
sure in Scotland than in England, despite Scotland's
move over recent decades-psychologically as well as
institutionally-towards nationalism.
The aim of this paper is to explore the connections between
lslamophobia and sub-state nationalism within Britain. Muslim
minorities in Britain and throughout Europe are now under threat
of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush 'War on Terror.' But
within Scotland, traditional Scottish self-consciousness, the long
debate over devolution, rising nationalism and the eventual cre
ation of a Scottish Parliament (inaugurated in 1999) all pose a
potentially additional challenge to Scotland's Muslims.
In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that
racial and cultural minorities identify with (inclusive) 'Britain'
rather than (exclusive) 'England.' Ethnic minorities within
England are notably reluctant to describe themselves as 'English'
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rather than 'British,' their modal preference being 'equally British
and ethnic-group'-implying, it is claimed, that 'Britishness' is
'inclusive.' And conversely there is evidence to suggest that
English nationalists-those members of the white majority in
England who describe themselves as 'English, not British'-are
particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural minorities. If
race, culture, and identity were linked together in a similar way
within Scotland, we might expect that the position of any racial
ly and culturally distinctive minority might have been under
mined by the growth of Scottish nationalism-even without the
added shock of Sept 11th.
Paradoxically our research shows that in almost every par
ticular the opposite is the case. It shows that Muslims in Scotland
identify with Scotland rather than the supposedly more 'inclu
sive' Britain; that the Blair/Bush 'War on Terror' has committed
Muslims far more strongly to Scotland than ever before; that
despite (or perhaps because of) the growth of Scottish national
identity and the advent of a separate Scottish Parliament,
lslamophobia is significantly lower in Scotland than in England;
that although lslamophobia is clearly tied to English nationalism
within England, it is almost uncorrelated with Scottish national
ism within Scotland.
This may imply that English nationalism is more 'ethnic'
while Scottish nationalism is more self-consciously 'civic.' But
Scottish nationalism does have an impact on phobias within
Scotland, though on Anglophobia far more than on
lslamophobia. The tendency of Scots to define themselves nega
tively as 'not-English' may provide some shelter for other 'non
English' groups within Scotland. Scottish Muslims gain some
advantage from being a 'double-minority' - a minority within a
minority.
But the relative weakness of all anti-minority ethnic phobias
in Scotland also reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of
Scottish political elites--critically including the independence
oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish National Party) as well
as the merely devolution-oriented Labour and Liberal-Democrat
elites. The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-culturalist as
these elites. But Scottish elites work harder to moderate public
prejudice than do English elites. So at the elite level there is a
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coalition of Muslims and Scottish Nationalists, which has been
strengthened by a common antagonism towards Blair and his
international policies. That elite coalition does not reach down to
the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to control
and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims and
nationalists-of the kind that exists within England.

Minorities in Scotland and England

The largest racially and culturally distinctive minority in
Scotland consists of ethnic Pakistanis. But the numbers of 'visi
ble' ethnic minorities in Scotland are low. According to the 2001
Census ethnic Pakistanis (almost all of them Muslim) constitute
less than one percent of the population. And altogether the 2001
Census shows that Muslims as-a-whole constitute just over one
percent in Scotland.
Nonetheless Pakistani Muslims in Scotland are 'visible' unlike for example the very much larger English minority
(defined by birth) in Scotland. And the Muslim Pakistanis are par
ticularly visible because they are concentrated in the Glasgow
area of west-central Scotland where one of them represents the
Govan constituency in the British Parliament.
In England 'visible' ethnic minorities are more numerous
and Carribeans, Africans, Indians, and others constitute a larger
share. According to the 2001 Census there are just over one per
cent Pakistanis but slightly over three percent Muslim in England.
Aga(n the Asian minority are more visible than their numbers
might suggest because they are concentrated in particular indus
trial areas of the North and Midlands of England.

Scottish Muslims feel Scotland is a relatively safe-haven

As part of a wider survey of minorities in post-Devolution
Scotland we carried out six focus-group discussions with (self
described) 'ethnic Pakistanis' in late 2002 followed by 759 tele
phone interviews with ethnic Pakistanis in 2003. Using a multi
lingual research team we were able to encourage both focus
group participants and survey respondents to use English, Urdu
or Punjabi (or any mixture of these languages) as they preferred.
In the focus-group discussions we asked participants specifically
about Sept 11th and its impact on their lives in the intervening
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year. Sept 11th had been as traumatic for Muslims as for
Americans, and a year later their memories of the time were still
sharp.
There was shock, disbelief and some shame: 'shock ... horrified ...numbness'[PK4-EJ; 'unbelievable'[PK6-GJ; 'ashamed that
Muslims could be involved in this crime'[PKS-BJ, 'it upset me
that my faith was being used'[PK4-EJ. But there was also some
resentment: 'They seem to associate terrorism only with Muslim
countries' [PK2-AJ; 'Look at what is happening in Ireland,
Belfast'[PK2-BJ; 'If someone is going to carry out an act of ter
rorism, they don't need to be a Musi im ... there are al I sorts of
factions around the world representing different ideologies' [PK4EJ. And fear. Fear of an anti-Muslim backlash: 'My mum and dad
said don't walk outside the house with a headscarf ... someone
will shoot you or something, kill you on the street... It was
scary... very scary'[PK1-GJ. But also fear of terrorists: 'Terrorism
can happen anywhere'[PK4-DJ; 'We saw Pan Am crashing in
Scotland'[PK4-E].
British people had become 'more unfriendly' towards
Pakistanis and Muslims: 'It has made a difference ...people look
at us with suspicion'[PK4-DJ; 'I heard of many physical attacks
made against Muslims ... my husband warned me not to go to the
Mosque after Sept 11th'[PKS-EJ; 'I blame the media'[PK6-FJ.
But amongst participants in our Scottish Muslim focus groups
direct personal experience of greater anti-Muslim attitudes in the
aftermath of Sept 11th was limited in scope and intensity: 'Not
really directly but people can be cold, you can detect the anti
Muslim feeling'[PKS-A]; 'Some people may say that we are imag
ining anti-Muslim feeling, but we are not; we can feel it'[PK4-EJ;
'racist looks'[PK2-BJ; 'cold stares ... worse in the early days after
the attacks'[PK2-AJ; 'I have been called Osama Bin Laden a cou
ple of times'[PK3-EJ.
There was some disagreement about whether Scots in par
ticular (as distinct from other Britons) had become more
unfriendly towards Pakistanis and Muslims after Sept 11th: 'I
don't think there have been any great differences between
Scotland and England' [PK3-DJ; 'It affected everybody rn
Scotland and in England'[PK3-EJ.
But most thought the problem had not been so bad in
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Scotland as in England: 'I don't think there were too many prob
lems in Scotland'[PKS-G]; 'It was only natural to have some
problem here but it could have been much worse' [PKS-A]. There
was: 'more trouble in England' [PK4-A]; 'a lot of trouble in
England'[PK2-D]; 'a lot more racism in England'[PK1-E]; 'more
organised groups in England which cause trouble against ethnic
minorities'[PK1-C]; 'The National Front party [now called the
BNP British National Party] has always been very popular in
England'[PK2-A].
A few felt nowhere was safe in the aftermath of Sept 11th:
'After Sept 11th no place in the world felt safe' [PKS-E]; 'If this
horrible thing had happened in Britain, I really don't know how
people would react here ...no place is really safe'[PK2-C]. But
for a variety of reasons, including both fear of anti-Muslim reac
tions and fear of terrorism, most were glad to be living in
· Scotland rather than in England or anywhere else. To them
Scotland for all its faults seemed to be a relatively safe-haven in
a very dangerous post-9/i 1 world: 'I was glad to be living in
Scotland'[PK6-G]; 'much safer in Scotland'[PK6-D]; 'Scotland
was a more comforting place to be than any other part of
Britain'[PK2-B]; 'most safe in Scotland ... if we were in Pakistan or
America, we might have been accused and attacked' [PK3-C];
'Living in France would be bad at the time and Holland would
be quite bad as well. .. I wouldn't like to be in America at the
time'[PK1-C]; 'It is safer being in Scotland than in Pakistan'[PKS
D]; 'Even when the IRA were bombing, they never came to
Scotland. It was always Manchester or London that got
attacked'[PK6-C]. It is quite a I ist. It seemed safer to be in
Scotland than in England, Europe, America - or Pakistan.
At the outset we hypothesised that Scottish self-conscious
ness, the long debate over devolution, and the eventual creation
of a Scottish Parliament after the 1997 Referendum could have
posed an added challenge to Muslims in Scotland. So in the
focus-group discussions we asked participants to compare the
impact of Scottish nationalism, culminating in the creation of a
Scottish Parliament with the impact of Sept 11th on Scottish atti
tudes towards Muslims. Both could have encouraged anti
Muslim feelings.
The response of focus-group participants was unequivocal 82
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not only was the Scottish Parliament less of a problem, it was in
their view part of the solution. Some even found our question
shocking: 'You cannot compare Sept 11th and the Scottish
Parliament in the same way [expressed in shocked
manner]'[PKS-D with agreement from rest of group]; 'Sept 11th
was a lot worse... and I do not think the Scottish Parliament has
been a negative thing'[PK1-D]; 'The only person [adversely]
affected by the making of the Scottish Parliament is Tony [Blair].
Every ethnic minority is fine [i.e. happy] with the Parliament in
Scotland'[PK2-B]; 'There was a peace statement made in the
[Glasgow] City Chambers from all the faiths wanting to work
together and overcome the difficulties. The will is there [in
Scotland] to improve things'[PK4-E].
The only criticisms directed at the Scottish Parliament con
cerned its lack of power, authority, influence, or effectiveness: 'I
am glad to be in Scotland, but there is a question about what the
Scottish Parliament can do'[PK1-D]; 'Foreign policy is dealt with
by [British] Central Government; the Scottish Parliament has got
nothing to do with it'[PK6-E].
The attitudes expressed in these focus-group discussions
were corroborated by our large sample survey. We asked Scottish
Pakistanis about their perceptions of conflict between Muslims
and non-Muslims-in Scotland, in England, and 'across the
world'. Although considerable numbers of Scottish Pakistanis (39
percent) do rate conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in
Scotland as at least 'fairly serious,' almost twice as many Scottish
Pakistanis (77 percent) believe such conflict is 'fairly serious'
south of the border in England. And 93 percent of them believe
such conflict is 'fairly serious' around the world.
At far lower levels, there is an even more striking variation
in Scottish Pakistanis' perceptions of 'very serious' conflict. Only
six percent think conflict with non-Muslims in Scotland as 'very
serious.' But 32 percent believe it to be 'very serious' in England,
and 68 percent feel it is 'very serious around the world' . They
may be wrong of course, but looking out from their Scottish van
tage-point, Scottish Muslims see Scotland as a relatively (if only
relatively) safe-haven.
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A coalition of Muslims and (Scottish) Nationalists?
The Muslim perception of Scotland as a relatively safe haven
is at least plausible. Scottish political elites, both devolutionists
and the more independence-minded nationalists, have consis
tently proclaimed a non-ethnic, inclusive, 'civic' concept of
nationalism. With the possible exception of the Conservatives all
significant political elites represented in the Scottish Parliament
have taken an unambiguous and self-consciously multicultural
ist position.
In particular the 'First Minister' [head of government] in the
Scottish Parliament, Labour's Jack McConnell, has declared that
Scotland needs more immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic
minorities. On the opposition side, the SNP (Scottish National
Party) leader John Swinney has accused Labour of 'racism' in its
ill-treatment of Muslim asylum seekers, repeatedly describing it
as a 'national shame' or a 'national disgrace'-despite the fact that
a large majority of Scots favour detaining asylum-seekers. For the
SNP this is a courageously and in narrow short-term party-polit
ical terms costly position.
Conversely Muslim Pakistanis readily identify with Scotland
while asserting their own culture and traditions and paying scant
regard to traditional Scottish culture. Their Scotland, like the
SNP's, is 'Scotland Future' not 'Scotland Past.'
In our survey of ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland we asked them
to place themselves on the standard 5-point Moreno identity
scale that runs from exclusively Scottish to exclusively British.
Very few refused. But when faced with this forced choice
between British and sub-British identities, Pakistanis in
Scotland-unlike their counterparts in England-reject British
identity. Even amongst those Pakistanis now living in Scotland
who were born outside Scotland, three times as many describe
themselves as 'mainly or exclusively' Scottish as opt for 'mainly
or exclusively' British.
Of course, that is partly because their primary identity is
'Muslim' rather than any territorial identity-be that Scottish,
British or Pakistani. Nonetheless insofar as ethnic Pakistanis in
Scotland have a territorial identity (and they do, even if it is sec
ondary) it is overwhelmingly 'Scottish' .
And this is matched by their constitutional and party prefer-
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ences. They now support Scottish independence far more than
average Scot. And in terms of voting Pakistanis in Scotland swung
decisively towards the SNP (Scottish National Party) at the 2003
Scottish Parliament elections so much so that by 2003 Pakistanis
in Scotland were over twice as likely as the average Scot to vote
for the Scottish National Party.
No doubt they were responding to the SNP's line on the Iraq
war, which the SNP opposed at the 2003 Scottish Parliament
election (and intend to make the centre-piece of their campaign
for the 2004 Euro-election). Various Muslim groups, including
the Lothian Muslim Voting Committeeand the Muslim
Association of Britain called upon Muslims to switch to the SNP
in 2003; and the SNP had long ago set up an affiliated organisa
tion 'Asians for Independence.' The Nationalist welcoming com
mittee already existed: all it needed was an event that could
loosen Asians' traditional ties to Labour.
But whatever the reason, the significant point is that this
racially and culturally distinctive minority is not alienated from
the party of Scottish nationalism (small 'n' or large 'N' ) but actu
ally far more favourable to it than the average Scot! Setting aside
the BNP (the extreme right-wing British National Party which is
far too easy a target), it is almost inconceivable that any English
National Party, however moderate, could win twice as much
support from Blacks and Asians as from the average voter in
England.

But are Scottish Muslims right? Is Scotland really a rela
tively safe haven?

Scottish Muslims are clearly attached to the inherently plau
sible view that Scotland is a relatively safe haven - even in com
parison with neighbouring England. But they might nonetheless
be wrong: it might be merely an outsider's perspective. Perhaps
England and the English are not so bad as they look from the out
side. One test is to look at the perceptions of the majorities in
England and Scotland. How do they rate the level of conflict with
their own Muslim minorities?
We use a tight definition of 'majorities' in England and
Scotland. Not surprisingly lslamophobia (and in Scotland
Anglophobia also) is lower amongst the minorities than amongst
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the titular majorities, and it would be misleading to include the
views of the minorities themselves in our calculations of anti
minority-phobias.
We define 'majority England' or the 'majority English' as
'White,' non-Muslims, living in England. And 'majority Scotland'
or 'majority Scots' even more tightly as 'White', non-Muslims,
born in Scotland, with Scottish-born partners (if any). It is impor
tant to exclude English immigrants in Scotland because they are
(proportionately) so numerous and so distinctive. It is unneces
sary to exclude Scottish immigrants in England because they are
neither (proportionately) numerous nor distinctive. This asymme
try is a consequence of the fact that the population of England is
ten times that of Scotland.
The perceptions of 'majority Scots' and 'majority English'
suggest that conflict with Muslims is indeed much greater in
England than in Scotland. Only 42 percent of majority Scots
think Muslim/non-Muslim conflict is at least 'fairly serious' in
Scotland. But 61 percent of the majority English think
Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in England is at least 'fairly serious.'
That suggests Scottish Muslims are indeed correct in their view
that Scotland is a relatively safe haven. A significantly greater
number of the English feel in conflict with Muslims.

Why is Scotland a relatively safe haven? Better Muslims
or better Scots?
It does not take two to make a conflict however. One is
enough. Perhaps conflict with Muslims is greater in England
because Muslims themselves are different there. The numbers are
different. There are more Muslims in England - though still only
three percent. Or perhaps Muslims in England are socially dif
ferent. One Muslim participant in a Scottish focus group claimed
that 'Asian people in Scotland are more productive than Asian
people living in England. You get a lot of Asians in England that
are uneducated, unemployed and involved in crime. In Scotland
Asian people make something of themselves, in England maybe
not'[PK6-E]. Or perhaps Muslims in England lead more segregat
ed lives. The same focus-group participant continued: 'In
Oldham [England] there were riots. One side of the town is total
ly White while the other side is totally Asian. The Asians there [in
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Oldham] are the scum of the earth... nothing to do but watch tel
evision all day, so they are out causing riots' [PK6-E]. And anoth
er agreed more diplomatically: 'It is better to live in a mixed area
than to be segregated' [PK6-G].
But another possibility is that conflict is greater in England
because the English are different from the Scots. If the people of
England are more lslamophobic than the Scots then Scottish
Muslims' perception of Scotland as a relatively safe-haven would
owe something to Scotland and to majority Scots, irrespective of
any differences between Muslims themselves. We can test that
directly. We use five strictly comparable indicators of
lslamophobia in England and Scotland:
Ml: feeling that Muslims 'take jobs, housing and health
care from other people in Britain/Scotland'
M2: feeling that Muslims 'could never be really com
mitted to Britain/Scotland'
M3: feeling that Muslims 'are more loyal to other
Muslims around the world' than they are to 'other peo
ple in this country'
M4: feeling that 'England/Scotland would begin to lose
its identity' if more Muslims came to live in
England/Scotland'
MS: saying they 'would feel unhappy if a close relative
married or formed a long-term relationship with a
Muslim'
Following familiar English usage, some of these questions in
England use the term 'Britain' instead of 'England.' In Scotland
they use the term 'Scotland' without exception. These five ques
tions provide a comparative index of lslamophobia in England
and Scotland.
In addition within Scotland we repeated these five questions
but re-wording them to focus on English immigrants rather than
Muslims:
El: feeling that English immigrants 'take jobs, housing
and health care from other people in Scotland'
E2: feeling that English immigrants 'could never be real
ly committed to Scotland'
E3: feeling that the English immigrants 'are more loyal
to England' than they are to Scotland
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E4: feeling that 'Scotland would begin to lose its identi
ty' if more English immigrants came to live in Scotland
ES: saying they 'would feel unhappy if a close relative
married or formed a long-term relationship with an
English person now living in Scotland'
These five questions provide a strictly comparative index of
lslamophobia and Anglophobia within Scotland.
Beyond that we have one indicator that applies only to
Muslims: M6: feeling that 'Muslims living in Britain have not
done a great deal to condemn Islamic terrorism' And there are
indicators of anti-minority-phobia that do not specify either
Muslims or English immigrants explicitly, though some may
apply more to one than the other:
P1: feel that 'to be truly British you have to have been
born in Britain'
P2: feel that 'to be truly English/Scottish you have to
have been born in England/Scotland'
P3: feel that 'to be truly British you have to be White rather than Black or Asian'
P4: feel that 'to be truly English/Scottish you have to be
White - rather than Black or Asian'
Large numbers insist that birthplace is an important criteri
on for nationality and relatively few stress race. But there is no
significant difference between Scotland and England in the
extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to be born in the
country in order to be 'truly' British, 'truly' Scottish, or 'truly'
English, and only a small difference between Scotland and
England in the extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to
be White in order to be 'truly' British, Scottish or English. In these
respects attitudes in England are only very slightly more racist
than in Scotland if at all.
But very consistently across a whole range of issues from
economic resentment and nationalist distrust to fears of threats to
national identity and especially social exclusion, lslamophobia
is greater in England than in Scotland. We should not overstate
the extent of lslamophobia. Our more detailed SSAS data show
that majority Scots overwhelmingly support cultural variety. They
overwhelmingly support laws to ban discrimination against
Muslims (race discrimination has long been illegal in Britain, but
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religious discrimination has not), and they are sensitive to the
lack of any Muslim or Asian MSPs in the Scottish Parliament.
Nonetheless around a third of majority Scots feel some econom
ic resentment towards Muslims and express socially exclusive
attitudes towards them. Many feel Scotland would begin to lose
its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland. Many doubt
Muslims' commitment to Scotland. And most Scots feel Muslims'
first loyalty lies outside Scotland.
On most but not all of these points majority Scots are rather
more lslamophobic than Anglophobic though most of them
doubt the loyalty 'to Scotland' of both the Muslims and English
immigrants. And while almost a fifth of majority Scots feel a per
son has to be 'White' to be a 'true Scot,' two-thirds feel they
would have to be born in Scotland (implicitly excluding the
English immigrants but not the Scots-born Muslims). In the event
of independence one third would withhold Scottish passports
from those they felt were not 'true Scots.'
So without overstating the degree or intensity of
lslamophobia or Anglophobia in Scotland, we have clear evi
dence that both phobias exist. We also have clear evidence that
lslamophobia is greater in England than in Scotland.
Excluding those with no opinion or mixed opinions, an
average of 63 percent of the majority in England agree with Ml5 (i.e. lslamophobia in England= 63%). By contrast only an aver
age of 49 percent of majority Scots agree with M 1-5 (i.e.
lslamophobia in Scotland = 49%). An average of 38 percent of
majority Scots agree with El-5 (i.e. Anglophobia in Scotland =
38%). So on strictly comparable indicators lslamophobia in
England runs 14 percent ahead of lslamophobia in Scotland, and
as a measure of its political significance we note that this differ
ence is greater than the difference between lslamophobia and
Anglophobia within Scotland.
Only five percent of Scots would be unhappy if a close rel
ative 'married or formed a long term relationship' with an English
immigrant, but 32 percent of majority Scots and 52 percent of
the majority in England would be unhappy if a close relative
'married or formed a long term relationship' with a Muslim.
So very few feel socially exclusive towards the English, but a
third of Scots and half the English feel socially exclusive towards
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fable 2: Impact on phobias of knowledge about Muslims
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Muslims. The difference, however, between Scots and English
attitudes towards Muslims is striking, and any suspicions that
answers to this question are affected by political correctness can
not explain why the responses are so very different in Scotland
and England. Indeed the intensity of happiness and unhappiness
varies between Scotland and England: 26 percent of majority
Scots but only half as many majority English go far beyond polit
ical correctness and claim they would actually be 'very happy'
to have a Muslim relative.
By common agreement, whether viewed from inside or out
side England, there is more perceived Muslim/non-Muslim con
flict in England, and that is linked, whether as cause or effect or
both, to greater lslamophobia in England.
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How strong is the connection between lslamophobia and
sub-state nationalism?

The usual explanation of racist or ethnic phobias is simply
'small-mindedness,' parochialism rather than cosmopolitanism,
brought on by living a physically, intellectually, or emotionally
restricted life.
Social background can affect parochialism. Lack of educa
tion, especially lack of higher education, is a key variable under
lying parochialism. Generation rather than age itself also could
be significant since the development of mass media and cheap
mass transport have globalised the world of the average person
to an unprecedented degree. Globalisation may have eroded dif
ferences between the educated and uneducated even as (higher)
education itself has become more widespread. By contrast glob
alisation may intensify class divisions: the working class operat
ing in a relatively local employment market and engaged in rel
atively routine activities are not only likely to have restricted
parochial outlooks but are more exposed to economic competi
tion from immigrants and incomers whether these come from
other cultures or not. Gender plays a potentially significant but
ambiguous role since women have traditionally (but perhaps no
longer) had more parochial perspectives yet at the same time a
more sympathetic outlook.
Both Scotland and England have National Churches
'Established' by law, the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland and
the (Episcopalian) Church of England. Their connection with the
state is now relatively weak and indeed obscure but they remain,
to some of their adherents at least, an expression of the nation.
In both countries the public divides into only three large reli
gious groups (plus many much smaller ones): the National
Church ('C of S,' or 'C of E'), Catholics, and most numerous of
all, the irreligious. It seems reasonable to ask whether adherents
of the national church take a distinctive view of Muslims (and
within Scotland, of English immigrants also).
But whatever its social foundations, parochial nationalism
goes naturally with racist and ethnic phobias. 'Multicultural
nationalism' is an oxymoron. Despite the conscious efforts of
political elites in Scotland including the leaders of the SNP
(Scottish National Party) there is an inescapable tension between
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nationalism and multiculturalism and a historic tendency for
them to prove incompatible. Pulzer argues that nationalism is
often 'inspired ... by the urge to emancipate' but that its 'logical
conclusion' is very different: 'a paroxysm of destructiveness.' The
genuinely inclusive 'civic' nationalism of the Scottish political
elite may not apply down 'at street level.' And in England there
are no equivalent 'civic' English nationalists, no leaders of an
English National Party with a multiculturalist agenda. So in
England the natural connection between parochial nationalism
and anti-minority-phobias is not consciously restrained by a
'civic' nationalist political elite. It seems essential therefore to
investigate the connection between 'street-level' nationalism and
racial or ethnic phobias and with the expectation that the con
nection will prove stronger in England than in Scotland.
Tabulating the attitudes of majorities towards minorities by
personal contacts and knowledge, class, education, age and gen
eration, gender, religion, nationalism, and partisanship suggests
that education is more important than class, that gender and reli
gious sect (Established 'national' church versus Catholics) have
no impact, and that the impact of religiosity merely reflects the
generational decline in religiosity a generational rather than truly
religous impact. So we focus on just five key factors: (i) contacts
and knowledge, (ii) age and generation, (iii) education, (iv)
national identity, and (v) partisanship or 'political nationalism.'

The impact of contacts and knowledge
Compared to those who say they know at least 'quite a lot'
about Muslims, those who say they 'know nothing at all' are
around 25 percent more lslamophobic (24 percent more in
Scotland and 27 percent more in England). In Scotland, the
'know nothings' are also 14 percent more Anglophobic as well.
The 'know nothings' are also around 16 percent more likely to
criticise Muslims for not sufficiently condemning terrorism,
around 20 percent more likely to cite being 'White' as a neces
sary condition for being 'truly' English or Scottish, and up to 28
percent more likely to cite being born in the country as a neces
sary condition for being 'truly' English or British (rather less so in
Scotland however).
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The impact of age and generation

Age and generation have a significant impact on
lslamophobia in both England and Scotland (though very little
impact on Anglophobia in Scotland). On both sides of the bor
der our composite measure of lslamophobia varies by 20 percent
across the age cohorts though age has more impact on simple
racial acceptance in England than in Scotland, and on both sides
of the border there is evidence of a sharp generational shift at
about age 55, rather than a progressive impact of steadily
increasing age.
By margins of 29 percent in England and 21 percent in
Scotland, the old are more apprehensive than the young that
Britain (or Scotland) would begin to lose its identity if there were
an influx of Muslims. By margins of 30 percent in England and
24 percent in Scotland the old are more likely to feel that to be
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'truly English (or Scottish)' a person must be White. By smaller
margins of 23 percent in England and only 14 percent in
Scotland, the old are more likely to feel that to be 'truly British'
a person must be White - 'rather than Black or Asian'. And by
huge margins of 55 percent in England and 48 percent in
Scotland the old are more unhappy than the y oung at the thought
of having a Muslim relative.
In Scotland all these indicators reveal a 'step effect' at
around age 55 - a generational shift rather than a progressive age
effect. And the same is true in England except on the question
about a Muslim relative.

The impact of education

Comparing university graduates with those who have no
educational qua I ifications it seems that education has more
impact on lslamophobia (and on Anglophobia) than almost any
thing else.
From graduates down through levels of school qualifications
lslamophobia (and Anglophobia) increase steadily. So by mar-

Table 3: Impact on phobias of Age & Generation
to 34

45-44

45-54

55-64

%

%

%

%

35

39

37

39

lslamophobia: average MI-5

42 [56]

46 [59]

45 [58]

55 [64)

Muslims not condemn terror

55 [63]

62 [69)

51 [57)

55 [57)

... born in Britain

59 [64)

70 [60)

59 [61)

71 [67)

... born in Scotland/England

59 [62]

65 [59)

60 [57)

70 [69)

White (to be British)

IO [12]

16 [12)

12 [16)

17 [24]

White (to be Scottish/English)

12 [14]

14 [17]

14 [14)

22 [27]

Anglophobia: average EI-5

To be 'truly' British / English / Scottish must be:

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [] are for England.
DK's & undecided excluded from calculation of percentages. Source: SSAS/BSAS 2003.
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gins of 49 percent in England and 34 percent in Scotland those
without qualifications are more lslamophobic than graduates. In
Scotland they are also 25 percent more Anglophobic.
The pattern is very consistent but not quite monotonic: those
with 'higher education below degree level' are slightly more
lslamophobic (and Anglophobic) than those with the highest
level of school qualifications.
Similarly, by margins ranging from 27 percent to 46 percent
in England, and from 19 percent to 36 percent in Scotland, those
without qualifications are more likely than graduates to cite race
or birthplace as a necessary condition for being truly
English/Scottish or British.
Only newspaper choice (closely linked in Britain to educa
tion) has a greater apparent impact on lslamophobia, and there
the causal direction is ambiguous. English readers of the high-
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Table 5: Impact on phobias of National Identity
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The impact of sub-state national identities

One measure of national identity is provided by answers to the
'Moreno' question:
Which, if any, of the following best describes how you
see yourself?
English/Scottish not British
More English/Scottish than British
Equally English/Scottish and British
More British than English/Scottish
British not English/Scottish
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(The term 'English' is used for interviews within
England,
the term 'Scottish' for interviews within Scotland.)
In the 1980s the Moreno scale was originally conceived as
a 5-point symmetric scale. But by 2003 only a quarter of major
ity English and less than three percent of majority Scots identified
more with Britain than with England/Scotland. Identification
'more with Britain' was much more popular amongst the bulk of
the minorities- including English immigrants in Scotland as well
as Blacks and Asians in England (though Asians in Scotland iden
tify very strongly with Scotland, not with Britain). The conse
quence is that the numbers in categories 4 and 5 (more British or
exclusively British) are now too small to provide a basis for any
analysis in Scotland and must be used with care even in England.
Nearly all majority Scots and most majority English are spread
across an effectively 3-point scale running from 'exclusively'
English/Scottish through to 'equally British and English/Scottish'
- that is on a scale that (effectively) runs from 'exclusive' to 'dual'
identities.
Compared to dual identifiers, the exclusively English are 20
percent more lslamophobic. But the exclusively Scottish are only
a negligible four percent more lslamophobic. Indeed exclusive
national identity as measured by the Moreno scale of national
identity makes people in Scotland more Anglophobic (by 13 per
cent) rather than more lslamophobic (a mere four percent).
Furthermore, the majority English (unlike majority Scots) do
spread themselves all the way across the full 5-point scale. So
arguably the proper measure of the impact of parochial nation
alism on lslamophobia in England is 28 percent rather than 20
percent- the difference between the exclusively English and the
exclusively British in England, rather than between the exclu
sively English and those who are equally British and English. But
by any measure parochial nationalism has a significant impact
on lslamophobia in England - yet not in Scotland.
The contrast between the impact of parochial nationalism in
England and Scotland is perhaps even greater when we assess its
impact on citing race as a necessary condition for being truly
English/Scottish or British. Compared to those who identify
equally with Britain and England/Scotland, the exclusively
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English are 27-30 percent more likely to cite race (being 'White
rather than Black or Asian') as a necessary condition for being
'truly British' or 'truly English'. In Scotland the exclusively
Scottish are scarcely any more likely (only two to four percent)
than those who identify equally with Britain and Scotland to cite
race as a necessary condition for being 'truly British' or 'truly
Scottish.'
Although its impact is not great, such as it is the impact of
Scottish nationalism in complete contrast to English nationalism
seems almost irrelevant to lslamophobia. Instead it is specifical
ly Anglophobic, focused on the 'Auld Enemy,' the 'significant
other' that helps to define Scottish identity, rather than on
minorities that differ far more in terms of race, religion or culture
from majority Scots.

Political nationalism: the impact of partisanship

P olitical nationalism, especially support for the SNP
(Scottish National Party ) can be measured by voting behaviour.
We use the voting choices (and abstention) of majority English
and majority Scots at the 2001 General Election. The only parties
that had enough voters to provide a basis for analysis in England
and Scotland are the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal
Democrat parties plus, in Scotland only, the SNP. (The extreme
racist BNP, British National Party, won considerable publicity in
England but very few votes.)
Taking the seven parties separately (e.g. distinguishing
Conservative voters in Scotland from those in England) the level
of lslamophobia is lowest of all amongst Scottish Liberal
Democrats (27 percent), and highest of all amongst English
Conservatives (67 percent). They differ by a full 40 percent on
lslamophobia.
Within each country, both lslamophobia and Anglophobia
are lowest amongst Liberal-Democrats. But while Anglophobia is
highest amongst SNP voters, lslamophobia is highest amongst
Conservatives - both in England and also in Scotland.
Non-voters come a close second to SNP voters on Anglophobia
in Scotland, and a close second to Conservatives on
lslamophobia both in England and in Scotland.
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Conclusions

In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that
racial and cultural minorities identify with supposedly-inclusive
'Britain' rather than supposedly-exclusive 'England.' And con
versely that exclusively English nationalists, those members of
the White majority who describe themselves as 'English, not
British', are particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural
minorities. If race, culture, and identity were linked together in a
similar way within Scotland, we might expect that the position of
any racially and culturally distinctive minority might have been
undermined by the growth of Scottish nationalism even without
the shock of Sept 11th But paradoxically we have shown that in
almost every particular the opposite is the case. Our research
shows that Muslims in Scotland identify with 'Scotland' rather
than 'Britain' and the 'War on Terror' has committed Muslims far
more strongly to Scotland than ever before.
It is a rational response. Despite or more probably because
of the growth of Scottish national identity and the advent of a
separate Scottish Parliament, lslamophobia is significantly lower
in Scotland than in England.
Insofar as Scottish nationalism has an impact on ethnic-pho
bias, it has more impact on Anglophobia than on lslamophobia.
So lslamophobia is not only significantly greater in England than
in Scotland, it is also much more closely tied to English nation
alism within England, than to Scottish nationalism within
Scotland. That reflects the tendency of Scots to define themselves
negatively as 'not-English' and to define the English as their 'Auld
Enemy.' More important, it implies that English nationalism is
more 'ethnic' while Scottish nationalism is more 'civic'.
There are other factors, notably age and education, that
have more impact than nationalism on lslamophobia. We have
focused on the impact of nationalism not because it is so great
but because, especially in Scotland, it is so very weak. Like
Sherlock Holmes, we have focused on the importance of 'the
dog that did not bark', or as Peter Pulzer might say, 'the tiger that
did not snarl.' The impacts of age and education are large but not
unexpected, while the impact of nationalism in Scotland is unex
pectedly small or even, by some criteria, the reverse of expecta
tions.
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That reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of
Scottish political elites - including the devolutionists of Scottish
Labour, the federalists of Scottish Liberal Democrats, and espe
cially the independence-oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish
National Party) who were determined that Scottish government
and Scottish people should not only be more independent but
more virtuous. They were minded to replace Gandhi's claim:
'Good government is no substitute for self-government' with its
inverse: 'self-government is no substitute for good government'
and add 'nor an excuse for self-indulgent citizens.' Hence SNP
leader John Swinney's claim (cited above) that 'racism' is a
'national shame' or a 'national disgrace' , a claim echoed in one
of our Muslim focus-groups by the participant who asserted '90
percent of the people here are nice but the other ten percent are
racist which is a shame for the image of Scotland'[PK3-D]. For
these high-minded liberal elites, independence meant responsi
bility rather than freedom.
The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-culturalist as
Scottish elites. We have evidence of a very slight tendency for the
exclusively Scottish to be just a tad more lslamophobic as well
as significantly more Anglophobic. But Scottish elites, critically
including Scottish Nationalist elites, work harder to moderate
public prejudice than do English elites, even English mainstream
elites that make no claim to represent English nationalism. The
Scottish Nationalist elite's multiculturalism does not reach down
to the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to con
trol and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims
and nationalists, of the kind that exists within England.
Consequently Muslims in Scotland are not mistaken when
they conclude that Scotland, for all its acknowledged faults, its
prejudice and its harassment of Muslims, is nonetheless a rela
tively safe-haven in a very dangerous world, the best place for
them to be in the aftermath of Sept 11th.
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